For five years New Zealand had Craig McMillan employed as a batting coach. He was a controversial choice, as his focus was not on technique, but rather on decision making. He was effectively being used to train the batsmen in their thinking.
There were a number of questions about both his suitability for that role and the value of the role itself. People felt that a technician would be a better option. Surely there was no benefit in playing the right shot, but playing it badly. And of all people to coach decision making, Craig McMillan? He was the batsman who gave Glen McGrath his only ever stumping wicket. He was the poster boy for poor decisions with the bat.
Neil Wagner celebrates with teammates after taking the wicket of Stuart Broad. AP
But under McMillan, New Zealand’s batting had gone from strength to strength. In the three years before McMillan took over, New Zealand’s top 7 averaged a collective 33.04. Zimbabwe were worse, but of the teams that had played at least 10 Tests, New Zealand were last by a long margin. During McMillan’s tenure, New Zealand’s batsmen averaged 41.95, which was almost 2 runs better than any other side. There were a number of factors behind that, but it’s hard to discount McMillan’s approach being a significant one of them.
Decision making, it seems, is an important part of success as a batsman. It’s also an important element for bowling. How long do they continue with a plan? When should they change plans? What’s the right length to try? What variations are worth using? The model that New Zealand have been using in their coaching is one where technical coaches are employed alongside former players whose job is to work on decision making.
And the first Test at Mount Maunganui has been an example of the power of making good decisions.
New Zealand found out early that there was not a lot of assistance from the pitch, but it was a little slow. So they brought in Colin de Grandhomme and took the pace off the ball. The English openers immediately looked unsettled, but, rather than changing their approach, continued to play him like a fast bowler. Dominic Sibley paid the price very quickly, playing one too early. That prompted a decision from Rory Burns, who started batting outside his crease to de Grandhomme.
That decision from Burns effectively allowed him to negotiate de Grandhomme much more easily. New Zealand’s next decision was to try just bowling outside off. England had a clear plan to attack anything that was on the stumps or outside leg. Giving them nothing there caused a period of inactivity, where there were only 46 runs scored off 23 overs after lunch, for the loss of two wickets. England needed to modify their plan.
They did. The new plan was to attack. Ben Stokes and first Joe Denley and then Ollie Pope decided to take on the bowling, and did so effectively, other than Denley getting a good one from Southee with the new ball.
New Zealand needed to decide if they would continue with their plan or find a new one. Southee had one. He was bowling slower and slower, but it was actually a quicker one that got the wicket. Southee was aware that Stokes was looking for the wide ones to hit to the fence, so while the majority were close to the stumps in the low 120km/h range, he threw a wider one out at 130km/h and Stokes had a go and hit it to Ross Taylor at slip. It looked like a bad shot, but it was also a clever piece of bowling.
Once it was New Zealand’s turn to bat, there was a clear plan. See off the frontline quick bowlers with the new ball, then attack Ben Stokes and the spinners, so that the English quicks couldn’t get a rest.
It was not really a success. Jack Leach had Jeet Raval tied in absolute knots, and it felt like an act of mercy once he finally got him out. It was like watching a cat playing with a lizard before eating it, such was the spell that Leach had over Raval. Taylor perished trying to attack Stokes, leaving the Kiwis precariously poised at 106/3.
Kane Williamson then got a stunning delivery from Sam Curran, and it was 127/4. Enter BJ Watling. It was a situation that required clear thinking and a solid approach. Getting too defensive would allow England to set up the batsmen, but attacking too much would be taking too many risks.
Watling and Henry Nicholls put together a good partnership to take New Zealand to 197 before Joe Root tricked Nicholls into thinking that he was going to turn a ball and trapped him LBW. New Zealand looked destined for a score around 300, and giving up a first innings lead.
But Colin de Grandhomme came out with a clear plan. He trusted his defense and gave himself time to get use to the pitch. He scored his first run off his 14th ball, but after that, he started to bat at his normal first-class scoring rate until the arrival of the new ball.
Once the new ball arrived, de Grandhomme decided to try to hit anything full. The danger was from swing, rather than seam, so by making that decision, he was taking a risk, but also punishing England’s bowlers for trying to bowl the most effective deliveries. The plan worked. England ended up having to go to spin with the new ball, but that was not effective either.
The partnership was past 100 when Ben Stokes finally made the breakthrough, and the prospect of a big England lead was gone. At the other end, BJ Watling was playing with clarity. He was either attacking or defending. There were no in-between shots. And that sort of clarity was what was needed on this pitch.
Everything that England tried initially made life difficult for Santner but he managed to find a way through it. He started playing with a clear head as well. The partnership grew and grew. And grew.
By the end of the day, the Black Caps had a lead of 42, and England needed to change something in the next day.
They came out with a plan: back of a length and make it difficult. Santner and Watling were prepared to wait for England to change it. Eight scoring shots in the first 15 overs. Attrition.
England were starting to get tired and desperate. Where was the next wicket coming from?
The new ball came and went. Still, Watling and Santner were resolute in defence and batting to their plan. They had only scored 58 runs off 32 overs, but they had not lost a wicket, and they were starting to look like the next wicket was never going to come.
Then the switch got flicked. First came an uppercut from Watling that Sir Viv Richards would have been proud of. Then came three boundaries in the next over from Santner. There was a change in intent.
Seventy runs off the next 14 overs, and England were starting to look ragged. Watling and Santner were now looking to score off almost every ball. The partnership ended when Santner found a man on the boundary, but the fun had not finished, as New Zealand kept attacking, taking the lead past 260 before the declaration.
England now had 120 overs to survive. What is the best strategy to do that? Take on the bowlers? Defend everything? This is the point where decision making is so important.
The English batsmen played well against the New Zealand quicks but Sibley perished against Santner, playing a defensive shot to a ball that he really should have been leaving alone. The issue was not his defensive technique, it was the fact that he was playing the wrong shot. He made a poor decision.
In the next Santner over, Burns attacked a ball that he really should have left alone, but was saved by Southee putting down a difficult chance. It should have been a lesson, but instead in the next over by Santner he again tried to attack a ball that should have been defended, and this time was not given a reprieve.
In Santner's next over, Leach got a ball that spat off the pitch. He was given out caught, despite not hitting it. But he was talked out of the review, and England went in three down. Not reviewing was just another example of poor decision making.
The next day Santner was creating lots of pressure from one end, while the swing bowlers were bowling from the other. Kane Williamson set a field with three men in front of the wicket, looking for a scooped drive. First Southee then de Grandhomme were pitching the ball up, taking the pace off the ball, trying to get the English batsmen to drive. It was an obvious plan, but it was not the only one.
There was also a man at gully, that seemed to be strangely out of position, but he was the man who took the ball straight off the blade of Joe Root from a Colin de Grandhomme bouncer. Root was so focused on the full one that he had no plan for what was really a poor delivery. He got caught in two minds and was completely undone.
The next wickets were mostly poor decisions also. Stokes tried to cut a ball that was coming back at him, rather than playing with a straight bat. Pope tried to crunch a full wide one that was actually a slower ball and hit it straight to Santner who took a blinder. It was not a shot that someone new to a crease should have been trying to play.
Next Jos Buttler left a straight ball that hit his stumps, failing to adjust for the fact that Wagner was bowling from wide outside the crease. If Buttler had moved his guard over, that wicket might not have happened. Changing his guard would have made scoring more difficult, but defense easier. In that situation, trying to save a match, that’s a trade worth making.
There was considerable resistance from the next pair, showing the specialist batsmen what was possible. Sam Curran and Jofra Archer put together a partnership of 59 off 16 overs before Wagner cleaned up Archer and then Stuart Broad first ball to wrap up the match.
New Zealand played better cricket and deserved the win. But the key difference was the decision making. The Kiwis had clear batting and bowling plans, and they were generally effective. Having employed a coach to work on that specific skill seems to have paid dividends, and is something that Chris Silverwood might need to think about as part of England set up.
Too many English players were caught between defense and attack or playing the wrong shot to the wrong ball. And that cost them a Test that had started off so well for them.
from Firstpost Firstcricketnews Latest News https://ift.tt/2QLNSEL
Posted in Labels: Firstpost Firstcricketnews Latest News
